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INTRODUCTION
Environmental degradation starkly poses fundamental concerns about the
proper role of government and the meaning of democratic governance. Two
prominent and, in many respects, diametrically opposed ways of conceptualizing
environmental discourse have surfaced within the legal community, each with
its own claim to democratic legitimacy. These two contending views fit
comfortably within larger modes of political discourse that I will call "liberal
economic theory" and "civic republican theory."
The central commitment of liberal economic theory is an abstract
conception of governmental neutrality, in which it is considered undemocratic
and illegitimate for the State to align itself with any one of many competing
conceptions of the good life.' Under this view, quality environmental resources
may well be a desired objective, but it is just one of many economic goods and
should not be singled out for special protection by the government. A well-
known early expression of this view is William Baxter's assertion that, "[e]very
man is entitled to his own preferred definition of Walden Pond, but there is no
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1. On state neutrality as the distinguishing feature of liberal conceptions of justice, see
generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-15 (1980); Ronald
Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113,127 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978).
Richard B. Stewart explores the links between liberal conceptions of neutrality, modem welfare
economics, and the justifications for environmental regulation in Regulation in a Liberal State:
The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537 (1983). For an insightful critique,
premised on Deweyan philosophy, of this commitment to neutrality, see Robin L. West,
Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITt. L. REv. 673
(1985).
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definition that has any moral superiority over another, except by reference to
the selfish needs of the human race." More recently, this view has crystallized
into a fiercely libertarian movement that describes itself as "free market
environmentalism."3 Although predating the free-marketers by several years,
Charles Meyers provided a succinct summary of liberal economic theory:
[Tihe proper role of the government in resource allocation and environmental
protection is to define property rights, so that market exchanges can occur; to
enforce those bargains and protect property rights so defined; and to intervene
in the economy when market failure produces external diseconomies such as
water and air pollution.4
The "proper role" of government, then, is to let concerns about environmental
quality be resolved through a myriad of bargained-for transactions among
citizens, reserving the power of the government to make suitable corrections
when these market mechanisms break down, generating negative environmental
externalities or spillover costs. Moreover, when the government does act to
correct for market failures, "public policy should aim to mimic the outcomes
competitive markets ... would achieve."' This model of political legitimacy
assumes that the only appropriate reason for managing any environmental re-
sources as common or public goods is purely a technical economic one,6 owing
to such factors as the benefits associated with economies of scale or the high
costs of defining and enforcing property rights.7 The reigning benchmark of
legitimacy, on this view, is the extent to which our public environmental policies
mirror the aggregate preferences of autonomous individual citizens.' This
2. See WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION
8 (1974).
3. See generally Symposium-Free Market Environmentalism: The Role of the Market in
Environmental Protection, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297-539 (1992).
4. Charles J. Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some
Criticisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426, 453 (1975).
5. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHmics AND ECONOMICS 191 (1993).
6. See id. at 193.
7. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1,10, 21-23 (discussing high costs of creating property rights
in some environmental resources and suggesting that the appropriate regulatory strategy is a
function of the "pressure" exerted on particular resources). One of the many very large costs
associated with creating and enforcing property rights in environmental resources is screening out
would-be "free-riders," whose presence eliminates the incentives for private production of such
resources. See RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
107-109 (2d ed. 1978).
8. See Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 6 (1991) ("Modem
economics . . .is dominated by a conception of welfare based on the satisfaction of existing
preferences, as measured by willingness to pay; in politics and law, something called 'paternalism'
is disfavored in both the public and private realms.") (citing generally DAVID GAUTHIER,
MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986) and RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 83
(1983)); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129,
1129 (1986) ("American law generally treats private preferences as the appropriate basis for social
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conclusion flows from liberal economic theory's commitment to methodological
individualism and that method's working assumption that "each individual
knows what is best for himself (or at least knows better than anyone else)."9
Civic republican theory also insists that government action mirror the
preferences of citizens, but unlike liberal economic theory, it assumes that
before public respect is extended to individual preferences, they must be
justified in public terms. The idea of "exogenous" preferences, a concept
central to liberal economic theory, is a non-starter for civic republicanism,
which recognizes the formative role played by social and political institutions
in relation to individual preferences.' From this perspective, it is proper to
demand that individuals offer reasons in justification for their preferences,
making critical examination and deliberation possible. It is this deliberative
testing or "laundering" of individual preferences" that legitimates the political
process and the democratic demand for self-rule.' As Mark Sagoff argues:
"The ability of the political process to cause people to change their values and
to rise above their self-interest is crucial to its legitimacy. Political participation
is supposed to educate and elevate public opinion; it is not, like economic
analysis, supposed merely to gratify preexisting [sic] desires."' 3 Accordingly,
environmental policies should not mirror pre-existing and unexamined
preferences; they should instead emerge as the product of rational political
deliberation. But more than that, this process of deliberation and reasoned
choice.... [s]haping of preferences, or the rejection of particular preferences as distorted, tends
to be treated as at best misguided and more likely tyrannical.").
The assumption that democracy is best conceived as a political system that produces
outcomes reflecting the preferences of individual citizens is also one of the foundations of social
choice theory. For an accessible introduction to social choice theory, see FOUNDATIONS OF
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986).
9. Meyers, supra note 4, at 450. For a discussion of methodological individualism, see Gary
Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 59-60 (1992). For a guarded but persua-
sive critique, see Philippe Nonet, The Legitimation of Purposive Decisions, 68 CAL. L. REv. 263,
266-73 (1980) (arguing that institutions, not just individuals, can have purposes). Michael Walzer
expresses a similar view. He argues that political protections are
not rooted in or warranted by individual separateness .... We do not separate
individuals; we separate institutions, practices, relationships of different sorts .... We
aim, or we should aim, not at the freedom of the solitary individual but at what can best
be called institutional integrity. Individuals should be free, indeed, in all sorts of ways,
but we don't set them free by separating them from their fellows.
Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 POL. THEORY 315, 325 (1984).
10. See Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, supra note 8, at 8-9; Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, supra note 8, at 1145-66.
11. On preference "laundering," see ROBERT E. GOODIN, Laundering Preferences, in
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note 8, at 75, 86-91.
12. For an overview of civic republican theory, see generally Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1986).
13. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 96 (1988).
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justification of preferences promises to generate decisions that can claim
universal acceptance. This commitment to universalism "amounts to a belief
in the possibility of mediating different approaches to politics, or different
conceptions of the public good, through discussion and dialogue."14
The concern of this essay is with the claims these competing modes of
discourse make to democratic legitimacy. I will argue that they fundamentally
misconceive what democratic politics can, and should, attempt to accomplish in
the context of environmental policy. By attempting to channel environmental
discourse within the sorts of frameworks they propose, liberal economic and
civic republican theorists blind themselves to more pragmatic approaches, and
obstruct the pluralism at play in our liberal democracy. Both theories aspire
to comprehensiveness, an aspiration that ensures both large degrees of paralysis
on the part of regulators and the erosion of public commitment to the efficacy
of our governmental institutions. 5
The respective theories promise both too little and too much for them to
be useful. Liberal economic theory promises too little, for it fails to recognize
that many of our highest aspirations, particularly in the context of environmen-
tal law and policy, are decidedly moral commitments that cannot adequately be
expressed in market rhetoric.'6 While these commitments are surely contest-
able and not uniformly shared by all citizens, they do represent claims that are
entitled to public recognition and respect. Liberal economic theory simulta-
neously promises too much by casually assuming that the information it deems
relevant to decision making can be assembled, interpreted, and applied in useful
ways that lead to theoretically defensible outcomes." Similarly, civic republi-
canism promises entirely too much, and seems to depend critically on a rather
remarkable view of the power of deliberation and rational justification. While
it would be foolish to claim that political deliberation itself is a bad idea, the
14. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988)
(footnote omitted).
15. For some acute examples of the paralysis induced by aspirations of comprehensiveness in
the environmental context, see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1213-30 (5th Cir.
1991) (remanding EPA ban, formulated by EPA after a decade-long rulemaking, on certain
asbestos-containing products for failure to satisfy substantial evidence standard of Toxic
Substances Control Act); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992) (remanding OSHA's
generic rulemaking for workplace air contaminants for lack of sufficient data and explanation).
For a general criticism of aspirations to comprehensiveness in environmental regulation, see
James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On Integrated Pollution Control, 22 ENVTL. L. 119 (1991);
Charles Lindblom, Incrementalism and Environmentalism, in MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT 83
(U.S. EPA ed., 1973).
16. For more discussion about the term "market rhetoric," see Margaret J. Radin,
Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 57 (1993).
17. See Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1041 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[E]conomic
theories are premised on a view that we have both adequate information about the effects of
pollution to set an optimal test, and adequate political and administrative flexibility to keep
polluters at that level once we allow any pollution to go untreated.... [I]t appears that Congress
doubted these premises.").
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universalistic suppositions that civic republicanism promises for deliberation
defy even the most romantic of imaginations. Politics and law are, and should
be, more often than not about winners and losers. In my view, it is best to
recognize this social fact of life, lest we dismiss very real losses as simple
misunderstandings. But just as civic republicanism promises too much, it also
gives too little. It leaves virtually no room for experiments in pluralism,
apparently wanting to "make a federal case" out of every issue of public
concern.
An alternative approach to environmental law and policy that is more
consistent with our liberal democratic traditions and is much less dogmatic in
its rhetoric was described long ago by Charles Lindblom as the "science of
muddling through," or "incrementalism." 8 This Deweyan approach has often
been characterized as a fairly accurate description of our environmental policies,
but it has rarely been defended for its normative appeal. This essay suggests
a manner in which the normative significance of incrementalism can be
appreciated and defended. As an approach to political discourse and
deliberation, incrementalism emphasizes that our judgments about the goodness
or legitimacy of environmental policies are contingent and revisable in light of
their experienced consequences; we need not worry about the extent to which
they satisfy abstract commitments to elusive and impoverished conceptions of
legitimacy. To put this claim in stronger Deweyan terms, democratic
governance does not, and should not, purport to conform its deliberations and
policies to modes of justification laid down in advance. Instead, democracy in
service of environmental quality is fundamentally about discovering and
inventing modes of justification through the practice of democracy itself.'9
These modes of justification are written in our history and in our culture,
embedded in and particularized by specific policies and the contexts from which
they emerge. They are, in this sense, irreducibly "local" in form and practice.
Part I of this essay examines the liberal economic model of environmental
policy. Part II discusses the civic republican model. In these sections, I argue
that neither of these models has made out a persuasive case for its own concep-
tion of democratic legitimacy. Part III offers a unified critique of both models
from a pragmatic perspective. Finally, I will argue that in liberating environ-
18. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79
(1959).
19. See JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 50 (1935):
In collective problems, the habits that are involved are traditions and institutions. The
standing danger is either that they will be acted upon implicitly, without reconstruction
to meet new conditions, or else that there will be an impatient and blind rush forward,
directed only by some dogma rigidly adhered to. The office of intelligence in every
problem that either a person or a community meets is to effect a working connection
between old habits, customs, institutions, beliefs, and new conditions.
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mental discourse from the claims of democratic legitimacy, we can better get
on with our experiments in environmental protection.
I. LIBERAL ECONOMIC THEORY: DEMOCRACY AS NEUTRALITY
A. Rationality and Efficiency
Economic theory addresses the problem of scarcity, and its mission is to
analyze how limited resources might be deployed to maximize the satisfaction
of individual desires. Its primary tools are the concepts of rationality and
efficiency.20
The logic of the classical economic model-its rationality-rests on four
principal assumptions. First, individuals are rational utility maximizers,
consistently basing their decisions on how they perceive that the consequences
of these decisions will advance their self-interest.2 Second, preferences are
best taken to be the product of autonomous individuals; they are exogenous to
social and political processes. Third, the model assumes that preferences are
largely incommensurable-i.e., there is no meaningful way to compare
individual preferences due to their inherently subjective nature.22 In the stan-
dard jargon of the social sciences, this assumption is often described as the
problem of making "interpersonal comparisons of utility."'  From this
incommensurability assumption, it logically follows that one cannot speak
profitably of an ordered set of social preferences, for there is no useful way to
aggregate, compare, or scale values that are incommensurable.24 Finally, the
20. The discussion in the text draws heavily from STEWART & KRIER, supra note 7, at 99-117.
21. For a discussion of this model of human behavior, described as "expected utility" theory,
see Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 587-92 (1992). For a critical discussion, see Amartya K.
Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
22. See Lawson, supra note 9, at 71 (concluding that "'every important advance in economic
theory during the last hundred years was a further step in the consistent application of
subjectivism' ") (quoting FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REvOLUTION OF SCIENCE 51
(1952)).
23. For an insightful intellectual history describing the emergence of the perceived problem
associated with interpersonal comparisons of utility, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great
Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1033-47 (1990) [hereinafter Hovenkamp,
The First Great Law & Economics Movement]; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist
Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305, 322-23 (1993). For a persuasive critique
of the idea that interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible, see DONALD DAVIDSON,
Judging Interpersonal Interests, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note 8, at
195, 196-211. For a vigorous defense, see Lawson, supra note 9, at 60-71.
24. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 3-6 (2d
ed. 1963). For a different perspective on the "incommensurability" problem, see generally Cass
R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994); Radin,
supra note 16.
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model assumes that governmental policies should be evaluated in narrow,
consequentialist termsO Policies are deemed good if, and only if, they
increase the satisfaction of aggregate individual preferences.26
Employing these assumptions, it follows that government should not
endorse environmental policies that enhance the welfare of some individuals but
diminish the welfare of others. A social choice of this sort would be objection-
able under the neutrality assumption2 Such policies, in effect, give official
sanction to the preferences of some citizens while devaluing the preferences of
other citizens. Under this view, we can never fully justify a winners and losers
approach to public policy because, under our operating incommensurability
assumption, we are unable to say in any case that the gains reaped by the
winners outweigh the losses incurred by the losers. Of course, it is appropriate
and consistent with the neutrality assumption for government to fashion and
enforce "Pareto-superior" policies-i.e., those that enhance the welfare of some
individuals without diminishing the welfare of others2 But such Pareto-
superior moves are widely recognized to be nothing more than conceptu-
alizations, to be used only for heuristic purposes, and experienced rarely, if
ever, in the "real" world. 9  Accordingly, restricting governmental policy-
making within this narrow compass quickly becomes unworkable in a society
inhabited by individuals with competing, mutually exclusive preferences regard-
ing the uses of environmental resources.
To deal with these inevitable conflicts, liberal economic theory relaxes the
assumption that individual preferences cannot be aggregated, measured, and
compared. It does so by positing that, in the aggregate, revealed preferen-
ces-behavior of consumers reflected in the prices they are willing to pay-
25. This idea is captured by Aanund Hylland's conclusion that "we implicitly assume that
individuals are concerned only with 'the business end of politics.'" Aanund Hylland, The Purpose
and Significance of Social Choice Theory: Some General Remarks and an Application to the
"Lady Chatterly Problem," in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note 8, at 45,
53.
26. These assumptions are often linked, in ways too complex to explore here, to many forms
of liberal political theory which embrace commitments to individual freedom and autonomy, a
rigid conceptual division between public and private life, and constitutional government conceived
in positivistic rule of law terms. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTrrLTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
27. Cf. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 129-33 (describing neutrality as an interpretation of giving
each citizen "equal concern and respect").
28. For a careful explanation of Paretian welfare economics, see JULES L. COLEMAN,
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAw 97-105 (1988). The Pareto superior criterion is sometimes
linked with rational consent and thus considered a unanimity requirement. See Guido Calabresi,
The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211,1215 (1991) (describing
the Pareto criteria as "a simple unanimity requirement"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law
& Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293, 333 (1992) (describing "unanimous consent" as "the
essence of the Pareto efficiency criterion"). But see COLEMAN, supra at 127-29.
29. See Calabresi, supra note 28, at 1216 ("[T]he set of Pareto superior changes which would
make no one worse off and at least one person better off must ex ante be a void set.").
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serve as a reasonable proxy for the social value of goods and services." This
reductionist move provides a common metric-dollars or "wealth"-that makes
otherwise incommensurable preferences a subject of objective scientific
inquiry.31 Through this method, it becomes possible to compare aggregate
social well-being (understood as the price-measured output of economic
activity) under a variety of policy alternatives. Allocative efficiency occurs
when the existing allocation of resources cannot be reconfigured in a manner
that increases this measure of social well-being.32
There is nothing in this model that would commend markets over
government-controlled allocations of a society's resources. Liberal economic
theory is, however, quick to point out that the large, if not insurmountable,
costs of collecting and analyzing the information needed to make such
centralized decisions would quickly render government control of resources an
expensive and potentially inefficient means of accomplishing appropriate
outcomes.3 Even assuming that such information could be collected at
reasonable cost, the troubles associated with centralized control are potentially
more problematic. The difficulty with government control of resources can be
described as a principal-agent problem. 4 Citizens (as principals) lack effective
mechanisms to monitor the activities of their political representatives (as
agents). Because of the relative crudity of our existing monitoring mechanisms,
political representatives can be expected to act in ways that promise concentra-
ted benefits to highly organized, politically active groups and diffuse the costs
30. See Lawson, supra note 9, at 88-96.
31. So claim some economists. On the "scientific" pretensions of modem welfare economics,
see Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, supra note 23, at 1036.
32. See COLEMAN, supra note 28, at 106-07. The use of this measure, typically in the form
of the Gross National Product (GNP), is controversial among environmental economists, many
of whom claim that GNP fails to account for environmental quality. See generally Robert W.
Hahn, Toward a New Environmental Paradigm, 102 YALE L.J. 1719, 1732-37 (1993).
33. For discussion of this point, see ALLEN BUCHANAN, ETHics, EFFICIENCY, AND THE
MARKET 16-17 (1985).
34. Terry M. Moe, employing "positive political theory," describes what he calls the "twist"
to applying agency theory to political actors: "[W]hile citizens are nominally the superiors in [the
democratic] hierarchy, it is the legislators who actually hold public office and have the right to
make law. Their role, as agents, is to exercise public authority, backed by the police powers of
the state, in telling their principals what to do." Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The
Neglected Side of the Story, J.L. ECON. & ORG., Special Issue 1990, at 213, 232. Part of the
problem with this arrangement, as described by Moe, is this:
In general, it is well-known that principals usually cannot exercise perfect control over
their agents, and, given the costs of control, do not find it rational even to try. Some
slippage-some shirking by the agent-is to be expected. This applies with a vengeance
to politics: constituents and groups, as principals, cannot perfectly control the public
officials who are presumably their agents-and, indeed, because they are so often
lacking in information, resources, and organization, there would appear to be room for
lots of official shirking.
Id. at 231.
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to the unorganized and politically impotent mass of citizens." By conferring
these economic rents on groups that can mobilize political support, representa-
tives maximize their electoral fortunes." In more common parlance, because
the primary objective of political representatives is to maximize their own
welfare (i.e., win re-election), the problem is the capture of formal government
institutions by special interests. 7  This combination of the high costs of
obtaining information and the lack of effective monitoring of official behavior
drives liberal economic theory's endorsement of market mechanisms over
authoritative, political allocations. 8  Unlike centralized decision making,
markets rely on price mechanisms to supply consumers and producers with the
freedom and objective information they need to engage in mutually beneficial
bargains with other willing social actors. 9  In smoothly functioning (i.e.,
perfectly competitive) markets, bargaining will continue until resources are
devoted to their highest valued use, thus achieving an allocatively efficient
equilibrium."
B. "Market Failures:" Externalities and Social Costs
Economists recognize, however, that markets do not always operate
smoothly. Environmental problems are usually regarded by economists as
35. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 165-67 (rev. ed. 1971).
36. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 23 (1993) (applying what the authors describe as the "economic theor[y] of
legislation ... political activity should be dominated by small groups of individuals seeking to
benefit themselves, usually at the public expense") (footnote omitted). For a slightly different
explanation for environmental legislation, based on what the authors call a "Politicians'
Dilemma," modeled on game theory's prisoners' dilemma, see E. Donald Elliott, et. al., Toward
a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
313, 324-29 (1985).
37. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
283-95 (1967); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). For a
sampling of applications of this logic to environmental policy, see generally RICHARD L. STROUP
& JOHN BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES: BUREAUCRATIC MYTHS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT (1983); BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF
BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE (John Baden & Richard L. Stroup eds., 1981); Terry L. Anderson
& Donald R. Leal, Free Market Versus Political Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
297 (1991); Gordon Tullock, Green Legislative Politics, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICE 39, 39-49 (Dirk Jan Kraan & Roeland J. in't Veld eds., 1991).
38. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 9-23
(1991).
39. See Friedreich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
524-28 (1945).
40. This is generally known as the First Welfare Theorem. See Hovenkamp, supra note 28,
at 300 ("The First Welfare Theorem states that perfectly competitive markets yield Pareto
optimal equilibria. Trading in such a market will continue until no two participants can benefit
mutually from another bargain, and there is no excess of supply over demand.").
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market failures in the nature of negative externalities or spillover costs. 41 The
conditions that give rise to such externalities may vary significantly, but one
primary condition is the absence of clear entitlements to, or property rights in,
environmental resources.42
A simplified resource allocation problem illustrates this proposition. A
firm discharges wastes into a stream situated between the firm's plant and an
adjoining farmer. In the absence of well-defined entitlements, the firm is not
required to bear the costs its wastes impose on the farmer and those costs are
not reflected in the prices that the firm charges for its products. By external-
izing these costs, the firm enjoys a subsidy that misinforms consumers about the
true social costs of the firm's products, leading to an overproduction of environ-
mental degradation.43
According to liberal economic theory, the problem of externalities could
be solved by clarifying the rights of the respective parties to the use of the
stream's resources. In my example, one might suppose that government should
vest in the farmer the right to be free from the harm caused by the firm's
polluting activities, with the correlative right to enforce that right in court."
The neutrality criterion might bar this solution because the characterization of
the firm's activities as a harm suffered by the farmer assumes that the farmer's
preferences about the best use of the stream are more deserving of protection
than those of the firm. From the standpoint of neutrality, it is irrelevant to ask
whether the farmer or the landowner is causing an externality; we should
instead attempt to maximize social wealth by allocating the resource to its
highest valued use.45
Suppose that legal rights to the use of the stream are indeterminate and
that the firm would be willing to pay $200 to use the stream as a waste disposal
site, but the farmer is only willing to pay $100 to keep the stream in a
pollution-free state." If we assume that bargaining is costless, any clarification
41. See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 22-25 (1977).
42. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
43. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Programs: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387, 393-94 (1981).
44. The choice of remedy-damages, injunctive relief, or both-also becomes an important
social choice. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972).
45. See Ronald J. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
46. It is wise to keep in mind that these willingness to pay figures are suppositions and would
be even in a scenario of the type described in the text. How one would determine what the
respective parties really would be willing to pay would be difficult, particularly if they knew in
advance that they would not actually have to make good on their bids. The possibility of
strategic behavior looms large. The government could, of course, conduct an auction, but this
raises the question of how the proceeds should be distributed-to the losing bidder or, possibly,
the general treasury? For a brief discussion of the attempt to devise methods to discern willing-
ness to pay for environmental quality in the absence of markets, see infra note 54 and
accompanying text.
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of legal entitlements will ensure that the stream will end up as a waste disposal
site.47 If the right to enjoy the stream is vested in the farmer, the firm will
find it profitable to purchase that right for any sum less than $200. Likewise,
the farmer will be willing to forego the use of the stream in exchange for any
payment in excess of $100. Thus, there is room for a bargain that will increase
the welfare of both parties-i.e., a payment from the firm to the farmer of
between $100 and $200, with the use of the stream as a dumpsite being the final
result. Conversely, if the entitlement to use the stream is vested in the firm, the
farmer will not find it profitable to purchase the firm's pollution rights, and
again, the stream will be used as a disposal site.48
Bargaining in the real world, however, is not costless, and rarely does the
problem of environmental degradation arise as a simple bipolar dispute over the
use of a common resource. More commonly, conflicts over environmental
quality involve many parties, making bargaining both difficult and costly. In the
presence of this kind of potential market failure, the efficiency principle may
make it critical for government to accurately identify the highest valued use of
resources and assign entitlements in a manner that reflects that use.
To guide governmental action in such circumstances, economists have
advocated the use of "the potential Pareto, or Kaldor-Hicks criterion, according
to which the project is efficient, and presumably therefore desirable, if the gains
exceed the losses, so that gainers could compensate the losers and retain a
residual gain."'49 This method is, of course, cost-benefit analysis. In my simple
pollution example, the analysis would reveal that the social cost of requiring the
firm to employ alternative means of waste disposal ($200) exceeds the social
benefits of an unpolluted stream ($100). Accordingly, in the presence of
transaction costs that potentially lead to market failures, the firm should be
vested with the right to pollute.
47. Coase, supra note 45, at 6-11.
48. Although the decision to vest an entitlement in either the firm or the landowner
presumably will not affect efficiency or social wealth, each of the alternatives plainly does carry
with it distributional consequences affecting the wealth of the relevant parties and thus their
willingness to pay. For a discussion of the importance of distributive effects in economic analysis,
see Calabresi, supra note 28, at 1211.
Another nagging problem with this hypothetical's conclusion, which is a variant of the
problems explored by Coase in the Problem of Social Cost, supra note 45, is the absence of any
clear explanation why or how the parties in this context would reach agreement. While there are
clearly economic gains for both sides from such a bargain, it is not clear why bargaining might
not break down when the parties attempt to decide how to distribute those gains among
themselves. For a critical exploration of this aspect of the Coase Theorem, see Hovenkamp,
supra note 28, at 302-09. There are additional reasons why bargaining might break down. For
example, the parties may simply be at odds with each other and withhold consent purely out of
spite. The existence of such "irrational" motives is simply assumed away by liberal economic
theory.
49. JOHN V. KRUTILLA & ANTHONY C. FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRON-
MENTS: STUDIES IN THE VALUATION OF COMMODITY AND AMENITY RESOURCES 28-29 (1975)
(citations omitted).
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The use of cost-benefit analysis to determine legal entitlements gives rise
to several theoretical and practical problems."0 For present purposes, I will
mention only two, both of which are discussed below. The first problem is that
cost-benefit analysis, understood in the Kaldor-Hicks sense, cannot plausibly be
squared with liberal economic theory's commitment to neutrality, and it reduces
to a positivistic conception of social relations that should be firmly resisted.
The second problem concerns intergenerational inequity and how the long-term
effects of present resource allocations are factored into (or ignored in) the cost-
benefit calculus.
1. Efficiency, Wealth, and the Pitfalls of Positivism
To produce genuinely correct (i.e., efficient) results, cost-benefit analysts
must be capable of accurately assessing the relevant costs and benefits. Yet
deciding what is a cost and what is a benefit is a complicated endeavor that has
proven to be extraordinarily elusive in practice."1 For liberal economic
theorists who advocate the use of cost-benefit analysis, this elusiveness poses
problems at several levels, of which I consider only two. First, the data
demands associated with cost-benefit analysis are very large and necessitate a
lot of time and money. These costs are social costs, and if very large, they
might make the enterprise a decidedly irrational affair.'2 Second, it is not
clear how the employment of cost-benefit analysis solves the principal-agent
problem that, for liberal economic theory, weighs against other forms of
justification for political action. If the description of official behavior created
by liberal economic theory is accurate, it seems likely that officials will
manipulate cost-benefit analysis (for example, by understating some categories
of environmental benefits) to achieve the outcome most conducive to their
political fortunes. In fact, this is a widespread criticism of the use of cost-
benefit analysis in the environmental context.
3
50. For general critical treatments of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion, see COLEMAN,
supra note 28, at 97-129; Lawson, supra note 9, at 88-96. The use of cost-benefit analysis as a
policy instrument in the environmental context has spawned an enormous literature, much of it
critical. See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 525-70 (1992); COST-BENEFiT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS (Daniel Schwartzman et al. eds., 1982).
51. For a judicial expression of differences on how cost-benefit analysis should properly be
conducted, see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1991)
(criticizing EPA's cost-benefit methodology with respect to asbestos hazards); International
Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting variance between the D.C.
Circuit's understanding of cost-benefit analysis and that of the Fifth Circuit); Ohio v. United
States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432,456 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Understanding efficiency, in cost-
benefit terms, "depends on how the various alternatives are valued.").
52. On the importance of administrative costs in the choice of management regimes for
environmental quality, see Rose, supra note 7, at 12-14.
53. See SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
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For most environmental issues the costs and benefits cannot be calculated
because of uncertainty about the effects of certain degrading activities, the lack
of consensus on whether certain effects should be considered a cost or a benefit,
and/or the lack of consensus on how effects considered a cost or benefit should
be valued. Valuation problems have raised the most difficulty, particularly
when the environmental resources under consideration are not actively traded
in markets. Some economists have proposed methodologies for constructing
"contingent" markets, based on individual willingness-to-pay, to yield "shadow
prices" for environmental resources.54 These methodologies, which rely on
survey techniques, are highly controversial among economists for a variety of
reasons
Assume, however, that we could discover through some method what
individuals really would be willing to pay for various levels of environmental
quality. The measured aggregate willingness to pay may not give us a fair
indication of the social value of environmental quality. An attempt to "mimic
the market" meets with a strong Deweyan objection:
The real fallacy [of liberal economic theory] lies in the notion that individuals
have such a native or original endowment of rights, powers and wants that all
that is required on the side of institutions and laws is to eliminate the obstruc-
tions they offer to the "free" play of the natural equipment of individuals....
The notion that men are equally free to act if only the same legal arrangements
apply equally to all-irrespective of differences in education, in command of
capital, and that control of the social environment which is furnished by the
AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 25 (Sept. 1990).
54. See generally ROBERT C. MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE
PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989); RONALD G. CUMMINGS Er
AL., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION
METHOD (1986).
55. The use of the Contingent Valuation Method ("CVM") to determine natural resource
damages under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988), and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A)
(Supp. IV 1992), has sparked intense controversy. For criticisms of CVM, see generally
CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Frank B.
Cross, Restoring Restoration for Natural Resource Damages, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 319, 327-33
(1993); Note, "Ask A Silly Question. . .-": Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages,
105 HARv. L. REv. 1981 (1992). A summary of the responses to the criticisms can be found in
Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Note, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent
Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Losses, 43 DUKE L.J. 879 (1994).
The D.C. Circuit tentatively approved the use of CVM for determining damages under
CERCLA. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 474-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Similarly, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has proposed to authorize the
use of CVM in assessing damages under the OPA. NOAA, Natural Resource Damage
Assessment Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 1062, 1074 (to be codified as 15 C.F.R. § 990) (proposed Jan. 7,
1994) (proposing "that reliable estimates of lost passive use value due to discharges of oil can be
estimated using [CVM] so long as the [CVM] study follows the guidance offered in this preamble
and the proposed regulations").
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institution of property-is a pure absurdity .... Since actual, that is effective,
rights and demands are products of interactions, and are not found in the
original and isolated constitution of human nature, whether moral or
psychological, mere elimination of obstructions is not enough.... The only
possible conclusion, both intellectually and practically, is that the attainment
of freedom conceived as power to act in accord with choice depends upon
positive and constructive changes in social arrangements.56
This objection is given illustrative force by reconsidering the simple water
pollution problem discussed earlier. Relying solely on the respective parties'
willingness to pay, we could safely conclude that it is more efficient to use the
stream as a waste site than to leave it in an unpolluted state. But we may later
discover that the shifting fortunes of the firm and the farmer dramatically alter
the amount they would be willing to pay for the right to their preferred uses of
the stream. Suppose that shortly after we vest an entitlement in the firm, it
faces unexpected budget constraints that limit its willingness to pay for the right
to continued use of the stream to $50. Suppose further that the farmer's
willingness to pay for the right to use the stream's resources remains at $100.
If a subsequent renegotiation between the firm and the farmer cannot be
consummated because of prohibitive transaction costs, we again have what
might be called a market failure, susceptible to correction through government
action. Although this situation is functionally no different from the situation
described earlier, unlike that situation, we now operate within a regime in
which property rights are well-defined. If the government wishes to allocate the
stream to its highest valued use, it would have to disregard existing entitle-
ments. Indeed, if efficiency determined by individual willingness to pay is the
governing criterion for distributing environmental resources among citizens, we
might conclude that the proper action for government to take is to coerce the
firm to transfer its entitlement to the farmer at an officially designated price.
This, as a general matter, liberal economic theory is unwilling to condone. But
why, we might wonder, should the mere contingencies of the circumstances
present in the initial situation, at which time property rights were determined,
provide such extraordinary protection for the preferences of the polluter over
those of the farmer?
The problem described and implied by the question raised above can
broadly be phrased in terms of a "baseline" problem. The baseline inquiry, for
purposes relevant here, asks the question: "Under what social circumstances
should willingness to pay be regarded as the appropriate measure of individual
preferences?" To understand why this question is difficult for liberal economic
theory to provide a convincing answer to, and why it casts critical doubt on the
whole idea of government neutrality in decision making, it is useful to reconsid-
er the initial situation a bit more closely.
56. John Dewey, Philosophies of Freedom, in FREEDOM IN THE MODERN WORLD 236,249-50
(Horace M. Kallen ed., 1928).
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The farmer's and the firm's willingness to pay for the use of the stream was
a function of at least three principal considerations: (1) their respective
preferences; (2) the information at their disposal;5 7 and (3) their respective
wealth. The third consideration, wealth, is a function of many variables, not the
least of which is the pre-existing legal rights held by the respective parties to
the use and enjoyment of their property.5" If we could conclude that these
pre-existing entitlements were themselves the result of neutral governmental
decisions, we could plausibly claim that relying on the parties' present willing-
ness to pay is a neutral decision making criteria. But these initial rights may
have been acquired by any number of means we might refuse to recognize as
appropriate-e.g., through force or fraud. "Initial distribution is a matter of
power, or it is a matter of equity and justice, but it is not a subject on which
[liberal economic theory has] anything distinctive to say."5 9  The problem,
then, in considering the employment of willingness to pay as a neutral decision
making device is this:
If there are objections to the starting point, there will be objections to the
finishing point, and nothing about [liberal economic theory] answers those
objections. The point is not that an objectionable set of initial endowments
calls in question the freedom or rationality of subsequent transactions (though
that may also be true). It is simply a matter of legitimacy in, legitimacy out.60
Only if some entitlements are fixed-that is, only if there exists some
baseline of property rights6' against which individuals form, rank and value
their preferences-can individuals express an intelligible answer to the question:
57. This information, or rather the lack of such information, may make bargaining costly. See
Michael C. Blumm, The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 371, 379 (1992).
58. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, supra note 8, at 1137 ("[Plreferences
may themselves be a function of legal rules: if this is the case, a change in legal rules will
produce a change in preferences.").
59. Jeremy Waldron, Criticizing the Economic Analysis of Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1441, 1461
(1990).
60. Id. Waldron quotes David Gauthier, who makes the same point:
The operation of the market is to convert an initial situation specified in terms of
individual factor endowments into a final outcome specified in terms of a distribution
of goods or products among the same individuals. Since the market outcome is both in
equilibrium and optimal, its operation is shown to be rational, and since it proceeds
through the free activity of individuals, we claim that its rationality leaves no place for
moral assessment. Given the initial situation of the market, its outcome cannot but be
fully justified .... But neither the operation of the market nor its outcome can show,
or can even tend to show, that its initial situation is also either rationally or morally
acceptable.... Market outcomes are fair if, but of course only if, they result from fair
initial conditions.
DAVID GALrrIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 94-95 (1986).
61. The term "property rights" is used guardedly here. These rights might take a variety of
forms other than what we traditionally regard as "property." See Rose, supra note 7, at 23.
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"What are you willing to pay for the right to use a particular resource?" The
more general point is that preferences, and hence efficiency, are relative to the
distribution of wealth-creating legal entitlements at particular moments. Unless
the baseline can itself be justified on neutral grounds, the willingness to pay
criteria rests on a thin veneer of neutrality that masks a host of factors at play
in our society that may be decidedly non-neutral. 2 There are, of course,
myriad theories of distributive justice that can be invoked to justify the choice
of baselines." However, as John Gray notes, reliance on willingness to pay
as a criterion for distributing legal entitlements, "presuppose[s] a theory of just
entitlements to property and liberty."'  Attempts to justify reliance on cost-
benefit analysis in ethical terms as the choice to which individuals would agree
under initial conditions of equality have proven to be extremely unconvin-
cing.65
While these somewhat abstract arguments are powerful in their own right,
there is yet another, more concrete sense in which the baseline problem arises
in the previous hypothetical. One of the key moves in the Coasean analysis
applied in that hypothetical is the assertion that conclusions about whether
particular actions harm others can only rationally be based on the arrangement
of formal legal rights at particular historical moments.66 This, however, is true
only for the most thorough positivists (of which liberal economic theorists are
the most prominent). It is possible that a well-settled baseline of entitlements
62. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATO-
RY STATE 41-42 (1990).
63. On distributive justice in the environmental context, see Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing
"Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 787 (1993). For a more systematic view, see PETER S. WENZ, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
(1988).
64. JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM 75 (1986). Compare the accounts of JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971) and ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
65. Two prominent attempts to make this kind of argument are Richard A. Posner, The
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 487 (1980), and Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis
Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK 31, 31-48 (Douglas
MacLean ed., 1986). For a devastating critique, see COLEMAN, supra note 28, at 115-30.
66. Coase's causal analysis of the type of situation described in the text is straightforward.
He describes a situation involving "a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those
occupying neighboring properties." Coase, supra note 45, at 1. In one of the key moves in his
analysis, he argues:
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be
made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A [the factory] inflicts
harm on B [the neighbors] and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A?
But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the
harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should
A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid
the more serious harm.
Id. at 2.
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to the use of the stream could be discerned, even absent its formal recognition
in positive law. That baseline may be embedded in the practices of the
surrounding community, and for that community such social norms may be
every bit as binding as formal legal requirements, perhaps even more so.67 It
is not implausible to suggest that in my hypothetical, the understanding of the
respective parties, both the firm and the farmer, was that the firm's pollution
represented an unjustified harm inflicted on the farmer-a harm that the farmer
and the community might reasonably have concluded gives rise to certain duties
on the part of the firm. Robert Ellickson has demonstrated that conclusions of
this sort can be observed in real, living communities.6" In fact, Professor
Ellickson concluded that his findings "suggest the unreality of . . .literal
features of the Coasean Parable."69 Community norms, rather than (and often
in spite of) formal legal rules, may ultimately determine the manner in which
entitlements are distributed and enforced.7"
The point of this observation is that liberal economic theory provides no
space for features of community life that may be essential to particular
communities' understanding of appropriate rules of behavior and norms of
social interaction. By focusing solely on willingness to pay and the contingent
arrangement of formal legal rights, liberal economic theory sets in motion a
process that reduces some of the most important features of our shared social
life to mere inconveniences or misperceptions of what is "really" going on.
These norms are considered irrationalities to be set aside should it be
determined that they contribute to inefficiency as defined by liberal economic
theory.7" Some of these practices might be far more than mere inconveniences;
67. On the role of community norms in defining property rights, see Robert C. Ellickson,
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1344-62 (1993); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce; and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
68. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 671-87 (1986).
69. Id. at 686.
70. Id.
71. Consider, in this respect, David Gauthier's justification for rational choice contractarianism
(which shares many of the assumptions of what I have described as liberal economic theory):
It would be irrational for anyone to give up the benefits of the existing moral order
simply because he comes to realize that it affords him more than he could expect from
pure rational agreement with his fellows. And it would be irrational for anyone to
accept a long-term utility loss by refusing to comply with the existing moral order,
simply because she comes to realize that such compliance affords her less than she could
expect from pure rational agreement. Nevertheless, these realizations do transform, or
perhaps bring to the surface, the character of the relationships between persons that are
maintained by the existing constraints, so that some of these relationships come to be
recognized as coercive. These realizations constitute the elimination of false conscious-
ness, and they result from a process of rational reflection that brings persons into what,
in my theory, is the parallel of Jurgen Habermas's ideal speech situation. Without an
argument to defend themselves in open dialogue with their fellows, those who are more
than equally advantaged can hope to maintain their privileged position only if they can
coerce their fellows into accepting it.... But coercion is not agreement, and it lacks any
inherent stability.
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they might in fact be the foundation of a community's sense of shared
existence. To override that baseline of social norms in the name of efficiency
may, in effect, be to transform an entire way of life2-a consequence the
normative defensibility of which may be debatable, but the claim to neutrality
of which is strained, at best. In the context of environmental law, we might
believe that some environmental resources ought not be reduced to private
property for reasons of just this sort: "their greatest value lies in civilizing and
socializing all members of the public, and this value should not be 'held up' by
private owners" 73 or by cost-benefit analysis.
2. Intergenerational Equity
The second objection to using cost-benefit analysis in determining the social
value of environmental quality might be aptly summarized by asking: "Which
'society' is the one that counts in the decisional calculus of social costs and
benefits?" The answer to this question, while seeming intuitively obvious-i.e.,
"Why, our society, of course!"-is really quite complex. This complexity is
generated by a host of factors, including two increasingly important points in
the discourse of environmental law. First, political boundaries (some of which
are quite arbitrary) may give rise to large international "market failures" that
raise a host of complicated equitable considerations, and second, we may be
interested in the weight that should be given to our responsibility to provide a
diverse, thriving stock of environmental resources to future generations. I will
focus on the latter point here.
One obvious answer is to simply ignore future generations. Such a decision
might be premised on either of two considerations: a value choice, or the
absence of any practical methodology by which to take intergenerational
considerations into account. The approach generally adopted by liberal
economic theory is to assume that aggregate preferences will not change much
over time-an imputation of values-and then apply an appropriate discount
rate to arrive at a present value determination of all future costs and benefits.
This latter approach, though widely employed by economists, raises intractable
subsidiary problems, a few' of which I will briefly explore.74
David Gauthier, Why Contractarianism?, in CONTRACTARIANISM AND RATIONAL
CHOICE: ESSAYS ON DAVID GAUTHIER'S MORALS BY AGREEMENT 15, 28-29 (Peter
Vallentyne ed., 1991) (footnote omitted). On Habermas's "ideal speech situation," see
infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
72. See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A
Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 961-66 (1991).
73. Rose, supra note 67, at 780.
74. The practice of discounting future costs and benefits is a bitterly contested one. For an
overview, see Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount
Rates. Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993); PERCIVAL Er AL.,
supra note 50, at 361-62, 531-32, 567-68.
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Liberal economic theory assumes that, at the margin, goods and services
are freely substitutable.' A second, related assumption is that in the long run
there are no resources for which adequate substitutes cannot be found. As
Robert Solow explains, these assumptions could lead to the conclusion that the
possibility of exhausting environmental resources "is in principle no 'problem.'
The world can, in effect, get along without natural resources, so exhaustion is
just an event, not a catastrophe. 7 6
This conclusion and the underlying assumptions are problematic for two
independent reasons. First, the idea that technological innovation can and will
provide substitutes for the finite stocks of some natural resources is sheer
speculation; it has no apparent justificati6n in economic, ecological, or
technological reality. Second, assuming that technological innovation can
provide substitutes for exhaustible resources, there is no reason to believe that
we should regard them as perfect substitutes for future generations who may
value them differently than we do.
The long-term implications of current resource decisions are not simply a
problem of choosing the most "efficient" use of resources as revealed by an
"objective" cost-benefit analysis. As Baumol and Oates argue, "in dealing with
the allocation of resources over time, the issue of intergenerational equity arises
unavoidably."77  The liberal economic model provides no theory of how
political action can legitimately mediate such issues of equity.7"
II. CIvIc REPUBLICAN THEORY: DEMOCRACY AS DELIBERATION AND
COMMUNAL CONSENSUS
Civic republican theory purports to provide a process that legitimates
political decisions that the liberal economic model cannot. It claims to provide
a structure that allows government to select particular conceptions of the good
without unduly infringing on the liberty and autonomy of individuals.
A. Community, Deliberation, and the Common Good
For civic republican theory, only a politics that promotes civic virtue and
the transformation of self-regarding preferences into public-regarding values can
claim the status of democratic legitimacy.79 Under this view, "[plolitical
75. For a classic statement of this assumption, see William D. Nordhaus & James Tobin,
Growth and Natural Resources, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS
400, 401 (Robert Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman eds., 1977).
76. Robert M. Solow, The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, AM. ECON.
REV., May 1974, at 1, 11.
77. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
138 (2d ed. 1974).
78. For a general theory on intergenerational equity, see EDITH B. WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENER-
ATIONAL EQUITY 17-46 (1988).
79. The idea that political processes are a means by which the community can "test" and
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participation is supposed to educate and elevate public opinion; it is not...
supposed merely to gratify preexisting [sic] desires."8
The key intellectual move for most civic republican legal theorists is to
invigorate the concept of political community. Rejecting the Hobbesian view
(sometimes regarded as the basis for liberal political theory) that individuals
enter political society as autonomous bundles of "prepolitical" preferences who
agree to cooperate socially only because it is in their self-interest to do so,"1
civic republican theory views the extended political community as integral to,
and constitutive of, individual autonomy and identity.' Citizens participate
in a community of discourse about "common perception[s] of ourselves and the
values we stand for as a moral community."'83 Civic republican discourse,
however, is not a means by which self-interested individuals or groups seek to
exert political pressure in order to impress their vision of the good on the
political community. Nor is it merely a conversation designed to produce an
overlapping consensus-a modus vivendi-that peacefully mediates and coexists
with an extant plurality of comprehensive general theories of the good.' In
civic republican theory, both of these views of politics are much too thin to
meet the demand for genuine democratic governance.
Civic republican theory links democratic governance to individual freedom
by positing a dialogic process through which citizens can transcend various
barriers to self-realization, such as weakness of will (akrasia) and distorted
revise "individual" preferences into public values is a central theme in the "liberal republican"
theory of Cass Sunstein. See Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, supra note 8, at 3-6; Sunstein,
supra note 14, at 1547-58. For similar expressions, see Hanna Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private
and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 347-349 (1981). Professor Sunstein applies this theme to
environmental issues in Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J.
LEG. STUD. 217, 245-47 (1993).
80. SAGOFF, supra note 13, at 96.
81. On Hobbesian political theory, see generally DAVID P. GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC OF
LEVIATHAN (1976); David Gauthier, Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist, in MORAL DEALING:
CONTRACr, ETHICS, AND REASON 11, 11-23 (1990); Jean Hampton, Two Faces of Contractarian
Thought, in CONTRACrARIANISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE: ESSAYS ON DAVID GAUTHIER'S
MORALS BY AGREEMENT 31, 33-50 (Peter Vallentyne ed., 1991).
82. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 218 (2d ed. 1984) ("I am not only
accountable, I am one who can always ask others for an account, who can put others to the
question. I am part of their story, as they are part of mine. The narrative of any one ife is part
of an interlocking set of narratives."); Michael J. Sandel, The Political Theory of the Procedural
Republic, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS 141,146-47 (Gary C. Bryner & Noel B. Reynolds
eds., 1987); Charles Taylor, Overcoming Epistemology, in AFTER PHILOSOPHY 464,478 (Kenneth
Baynes et al. eds., 1987) (claiming the "priority of society as the locus of the individual's
identity"). For a useful overview of the clash between these "communitarian" approaches and
more "liberal" ones, see STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS
(1992); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV.
685, 733-36 (1992).
83. SAGOFF, supra note 13, at 122.
84. See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
1 (1987).
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preferences, caused by cognitive dissonance and imperfect information."5 At
the center of this view of democratic governance is the argument:
[A] political process can validate a societal norm as self-given law only if (i)
participation in the process results in some shifts or adjustment in relative
understandings on the parts of some participants, and (ii) there exists a set of
prescriptive social and procedural conditions such that one's undergoing, under
those conditions, such a dialogic modulation of one's understandings is not
considered or experienced as coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a violation of
one's identity or freedom.'
Rational, undistorted deliberation about the common good among political
equals will yield "unanimous and rational consensus, not an optimal compro-
mise between irreducibly opposed interests."' Under this view, it is possible,
through politics and law, to fashion an environmental policy that each and
every citizen would warmly embrace as fitting and appropriate, or more simply,
good. Such policies would truly mirror the politically informed preferences of
citizens.
B. Politics, Pluralism, and Environmental Law
The difficulties associated with civic republican theory as a descriptive
claim about how ground level politics really works need not be substantiated
by scores of empirical studies. We are constantly being reminded of the power
of "special interests" and their ability to influence political outcomes. The
history of environmental law and politics does not fit comfortably within the
framework of a civic republican model. It is better explained as the product of
both interest group pressure and political bargaining-just what a pluralist
political model might predict.'
85. For an argument along these lines, see Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1557-58. For a typology
of the sorts of barriers that stand in the way of self-realization, see Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, supra note 8, at 1138-69. These barriers to what may be considered
rational beliefs, motivations, and actions are a recurrent theme in the work of Jon Elster. See,
e.g., JON ELSTER, THE MULTIPLE SELF (1986); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983); JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 37 (1984); Jon Elster, Weakness of Will and the Free-Rider Problem,
1 ECON. & PHIL. 231 (1985). For a somewhat different perspective, coming from cognitive
psychology, on what appears to be individual irrationality, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). For the implications of the latter
perspective in environmental decision making, see Roger G. Nolr & James E. Krier, Some
Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990).
86. Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1526-27 (1988).
87. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES, supra note 85, at 35.
88. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 26-41,
56-57 (1981); Elliott et al., supra note 36; Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the
Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 311, 316-17
(Autumn 1991); Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 191, 196-97 (1988); Alfred Marcus, The Environmental Protection Agency, in THE POLITICS
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But then civic republican theory is largely not intended to provide a
description of how politics is currently conducted or how environmental law has
been formulated in the past. Indeed, most civic republican theorists acknow-
ledge (and deplore) the hegemony of the pluralist tradition in American public
law. Accordingly, a critique of civic republican theory's descriptive power fails
to connect with its essential rhetorical message. It is on civic republican
theory's normative terms that its claims to legitimacy must be evaluated. While
there is much to favor in civic republican theory, particularly its insistence on
the transformative potential of political deliberation, its distinctive criteria of
legitimacy are deeply problematic. In the next two subsections, I argue that
civic republican theory's twin commitments to the deliberative laundering of
preferences, as a means to achieve its universalistic ambitions, and to the
primacy of citizenship combine to form a deeply problematic vision of social
and political life.
1. Deliberative Politics and the Universalist Impulse
The heart of the problem with the civic republican claim to legitimacy is
its utterly romantic assumption that deliberation can actually yield uncoerced,
universal commitments on environmental policy. 9 Consider this claim against
OF REGULATION 267 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). William Rodgers, Jr. has applied game-
theoretic models to explain the presence of "fakery" and "deception" in environmental laws. See
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception in the
Evolution of the Environmental Statutes, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377 (1989); William H.
Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Red Squirrel: Consensus and Betrayal in the Environmental
Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 161 (1989).
While there are notorious counter-examples, I do not, like some (but certainly not all) of
the scholars listed above, conclude that this interest group pressure and bargaining undermines
the legitimacy of much of our current environmental practices. Many of the conclusions voiced
to the contrary are premised in the logic of public choice theory, which seems to portray the
world in black-and-white terms: there are public-promoting policies and special interest policies.
By contrast, I believe this distinction is much more elusive, and depends vitally on what one
posits to be a suitably public interest. For explorations of this indeterminacy, and an articulation
of views I generally share, see Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the
Theoretical and "Empirical' Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199 (1988).
89. This claim can also be quite confusing. Perhaps the two most prominent proponents of
civic republicanism, Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman, express the aspiration to universalism
in a way that purports to provide room for diversity (a.k.a. pluralism). Accordingly, it is not with
their presumed intentions that I am primarily concerned; rather it is with the rhetoric they employ
to convey those intentions. Professor Michelman, for example, speaks of an "inclusory, plurality-
protecting ideal that arguably characterizes the [civic republican] tradition at its best." Frank I.
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1505-06 (1988). At the same time, he concludes
that those who take pluralism seriously cannot also be republicans; under his view, "[flor true
pluralists, good politics can only be a market-like medium through which variously interested and
motivated individuals and groups seek to maximize their own particular preferences." Id. at 1508.
He also claims that "the pluralist picture of politics cannot do without higher law." Id. I think
both of these claims are badly mistaken. In my view, Professor Michelman cannot see that while
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the water pollution problem discussed in connection with liberal economic
theory. One could imagine that the parties may justify their preferences with
the following kinds of reasons. The firm may take the initial position that its
discharges into the stream do not adversely affect the farmer's use of the stream
at all. It might even offer a credible scientific report that supports this
assertion. By contrast, the farmer might insist that pollution is bad in and of
itself; it destroys the natural ecological conditions of the stream which are
intrinsically valuable and which should command our respect.9" And the
farmer, too, may offer a credible scientific report in support of his position.
The firm could respond that the farmer has interpreted the concept of "harm"
much too broadly. The farmer would make the opposite argument: the firm has
unduly restricted the concept of harm.
The firm might even take the position that, assuming that some "harm" has
occurred, it should be allowed to continue to use the stream because of the
importance of its operations and products to the community. It could claim
that the "public interest" lies in the continued utilization of the stream as a
disposal site. The farmer may respond that the firm has interpreted the "public
interest" in much too narrow a fashion; the stream should remain unpolluted
for the benefit of existing and future generations, and therefore should not be
sacrificed to meet short-term economic goals.
This short exercise in imagination illustrates that there may not be a
common metric by which to assess the merits of competing claims to the use of
environmental resources. At each step in this argumentative structure, the
universalism may be an imminent aim of truly virtuous politics, it is an aim that is held in
plurality, shifts with context, and is never realized.
Professor Sunstein is quite candid about the difficulties associated with the aspirations of
universalism. He acknowledges that "[t]he task of incorporating into republican theories the need
for intermediate organizations to be insulated from the state is a large and critical one." Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1574 (1988). What seems to bother
Professor Sunstein about pluralism is that its advocates, whom he describes as "antirepublicans,"
"can give no account of the normative foundations of [their] own rhetoric." Id. at 1575 (quoting
JURGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 294, 336-37 (1987)).
This is a problem only if we believe that there is a (unitary) foundation that supports and
legitimates rhetorical practices. If we drop that idea, the problem goes away. Moreover, it is not
precisely clear what the "foundational" justification for civic republicanism is. For example,
Professor Sunstein's version seems to presuppose that the boundaries that make up the formal
jurisdiction of the modem State, particularly the United States, are suitable ones for determining
the extent of the community within which justifications can be legitimately demanded of all
persons, institutions, or groups. What is the "normative foundation" of that rhetoric-nation-
alism? In short, why should the lines be drawn in this fashion rather than some other way? For
the beginnings of what might justify plurality in place of universality, consider Seyla Benhabib's
distinction between relations to others based on "formal reciprocity" and those based on
"complementary reciprocity." SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF
THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL THEORY 340-41 (1986).
90. See Holmes Rolston, III, Duties to Ecosystems, in COMPANION TO A SAND COUNTY
ALMANAC 246, 247 (J. Baird Callicott ed., 1987).
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parties invoke norms of diverse, multiple and particular institutions and
communities (e.g., norms of science, community and equity) in justification of
their respective positions. Remarkably, in the structure imagined, the parties
seem to agree at points about what norms to consult; they just disagree about
what those norms dictate. Still, there is no reason to suspect that even this
basic level of agreement-i.e., what the "problem is about"-will occur in the
generality of environmental disputes. Indeed, liberal economic theory wants to
start rational argumentation from the premise that environmental degradation
is an "economic" problem-a premise that civic republicans are likely to reject.
It is possible that the firm and the farmer in the initial example each might
be moved by the force of the other's justifications. One should not dismiss the
possibility of some sort of agreement that both are prepared to accept as good.
But what is it about deliberation that ensures such a result? Civic republican-
ism fails to describe why or how authority in the service of the common good
may legitimately be exercised in the face of genuine disagreement generated by
rational argumentation from different premises. It simply posits that rational
deliberation ensures that an agreement will be reached.91 Consider how
implausible such a conclusion is when we move the water pollution dispute
from the local level in the hypothetical to a debate in the legislature, then to
the particularities of rulemaking by administrative agencies, then to the
decisions of the courts, and finally throughout the political community. That
movement illustrates, if only in a general way, that the context in which conflict
or disagreement occurs may (indeed, is likely to) require the parties to establish
structures of justification-modes of rational argumentation-that will vary
depending on that context.92 More troubling, within each of its institutional
moments-as a political, legislative problem; as an administrative problem; as
91. For a defense of deliberative democracy shorn of universalistic rhetoric, see Bernard
Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 357-64 (1987). He
concludes
The free individual is not one who already knows absolutely what he wants, but one
who has incomplete preferences and is trying by means of interior deliberation and
dialogue with others to determine precisely what he does want. When individuals
approach political decision making, they only partially know what they want. We are
justified in taking as a basis for legitimacy not their predetermined will but the process
by which they determine their will. ... Without renouncing a concern for legitimacy,
which in the modern world can only be based on the individual, deliberation makes it
possible to avoid the exorbitant requirements of universality and unanimity.
Id. at 364.
92. See. e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc'Y, 3, 4 (1980)
(noting "the existence of legal consciousness as an entity with a measure of autonomy ... a set
of concepts and intellectual operations that evolves according to a pattern of its own, and
exercises an influence on results distinguishable from those of political power and economic
interest"). For a particular application, see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80
VA. L. REV. 201 (1994).
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a legal problem; as a problem of "obligation"-there may be wide-ranging
disputes about the appropriate premises from which justifications for action can
emerge. This problem can shift to yet another dimension: the various institu-
tions involved may have radically different understandings of their respective
functions and purposes. These institutions may, in short, fail to observe the
lines that determine the appropriate sphere of their activities. Accordingly, as
we move from institution to institution, the very nature of the problem changes;
it is redefined and categorized in a manner that is conducive to the self-
understanding of the institution involved. Any agreement reached at a
particular moment within a particular institution is likely to become fragile as
it radiates through the plurality of institutions in our society.93 However, civic
republican theorists do not suggest that the absence of agreement on environ-
mental issues among this plurality of institutions means that no decisions are
necessary; that the status quo should be regarded as the legitimate baseline. So
the question becomes: "Which among various competing institutional concep-
tions of the public good is the legitimate one?"
In the most basic sense, civic republican theory embraces the possibility of
transforming the politics of compromise and bargaining into a politics of
rational discourse or genuine deliberation. It seeks to transform political
processes94 in such a way as to satisfy what Jurgen Habermas calls the "formal
conditions of a rational life."" Under such conditions, "truth claims ... can
only be redeemed by the unforced force of the better argument. 96  By
assuming that political participants must speak in the voice of reason, with
reference to the common good, civic republican theory posits that all partici-
pants expose themselves to the force of reason, and are thereby influenced to
give up their prejudices and self-interest in favor of a rational decision about
the collective good.97
The problem is, first, that we do not have political processes that satisfy the
formal conditions for such rational discourse-what Jurgen Habermas describes
as the "ideal speech situation."9' Second, we have no descriptively apt concep-
93. This does not imply any necessity to this plurality as a theoretical point; it is only meant
to point out that the extant plurality in our political community is a sufficient cause for a plurality
of meanings, and conflict among them, to be generated.
94. The discussion of institutional pluralism in the text immediately following this statement
gives rise to a critical ambiguity in civic republican theory-i.e., the appropriate scope of the
concept of the "political," a point explored briefly infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
On the conceptual difficulties of confining the concept of the political, see Agnes Heller, The
Concept of the Political Revisited, in PoLICAL THEORY TODAY 330-43 (David Held ed., 1991).
95. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACrION 74 (Thomas McCarthy
trans., 1984).
96. Gardbaum, supra note 82, at 714.
97. See ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES, supra note 85, at 36.
98. The "ideal speech situation" is described in JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS
107-108 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975). A useful description is also provided by Seyla
Benhabib:
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tion of what those conditions might look like in our society of plural norms or
how to go about getting from "here" to "there."99 "There is no God's eye
point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are only various
points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and purposes that
their descriptions and theories subserve."1 ° The consequence of this, as Jon
Elster argues, is a kind of "double bind:"''
[Olne cannot assume that one will get closer to a good society by acting as if
one had already arrived. If, as suggested by Habermas, free and rational
discussion will only be possible in a society where political and economic
domination have been abolished, it is by no means obvious that abolition can
be brought about by rational argumentation. [Moreover,] even in the good
society the process of rational discussion could be fragile, and vulnerable to
individual or collective self-deception. To make it stable there would be a need
Habermas names discourse through which truth and normative claims are thematized
"theoretical" and "practical" ones, respectively. The aim of discourses is to generate a
"rationally motivated consensus" on controversial claims. . . . The "ideal speech
situation" specifies the formal properties that discursive argumentations would have to
possess if the consensus thus attained were to be distinguished from a mere compromise
or an agreement of convenience. . . . It serves to delineate those aspects of an
argumentation process which would lead to a "rationally motivated" as opposed to a
false or apparent consensus.... The four conditions of the ideal speech situation are:
first, each participant must have an equal chance to initiate and to continue communica-
tion; second, each must have an equal chance to make assertions, recommendations, and
explanations, and to challenge justifications. Together we can call all these the
"symmetry condition." Third, all must have equal chances as actors to express their
wishes, feelings, and intentions; and fourth, the speakers must act as if in contexts of
action there is an equal distribution of chances "to order and resist orders, to pormise
[sic] and to refuse, to be accountable for one's conduct and to demand accountability
from others."
Benhabib, supra note 89, at 284-85 (1986) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
99. Jon Elster lists seven theoretical objections to the idea that rational consensus can be
reached through deliberation: (1) the issue of "paternalism"-it might be considered an
"unwarranted interference to impose on the citizens the obligation to participate in political
discussion;" (2) "unanimous and rational agreement would not necessarily ensue" in a regime
exclusively devoted to pursuing other-regarding policies; (3) even if unanimity were possible,
"[s]ince there are in fact always time constraints on discussions-often the stronger the more
important the issues-unanimity will rarely be achieved;" (4) some movement toward an ideal
speech situation is not necessarily desirable---"[i]n some cases a little discussion is a dangerous
thing, worse in fact than no discussion at all;" (5) the problem of "group-think"-a challenge to
"the implicit assumption that the body politic as a whole is better or wiser than the sum of its
parts;" (6) "unanimity, were it to be realized, might easily be due to conformity rather than to
rational agreement;" and (7) "a denial of the view that the need to couch one's arguments in
terms of the common good will purge the desires of all selfish elements." ELSTER, SOUR
GRAPES, supra note 85, at 37-41. Fori a survey of the critical literature on Habermas' "ideal
speech situation," see BENHABIB, supra note 89, at 282-343.
100. HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 50 (1981).
101. For more discussion about the term "double bind," see Margaret J. Radin, The
Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1699-1704 (1990).
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for structures-political institutions-that could easily reintroduce an element
of domination." z
The double bind, in short, is that because we currently do not have an ideal
speech situation, we will not get free and rational deliberation,"°3 and we
could only get it by engaging in dominating and authoritative speech to offset
the dominating elements that now make the ideal speech situation impossible.
Suppose the latter suggestion is plausible. Notice that it begs the question:
Who is this "we?"
2. Citizenship, Politics and Law
My second objection to civic republican theory responds to this question
(Who is this "we?") by exploring civic republican theory's underlying premise
that "only as [a] citizen, as [a] political animal involved in a vivere civile with
his fellows [can an individual] fulfill his nature, achieve virtue, and find his
world rational."'' I understand this underlying premise to mean two things.
First, that there is some privileged position that politics occupies by virtue of
its connection to some innate or "essential" aspect of human nature, and
second, that the primary purpose of politics is to transform self-interested
individuals into other-regarding citizens-to instill civic virtue.
With this understanding, the civic republican theory of citizenship makes
two critical errors. The first error lies in positing as an end of politics the
promotion of civic virtue. This assumption "turn[s] into the main purpose of
politics something that can only be a by-product."'"5 To be sure, political dis-
course can change one's understanding of what a good environmental policy
might look like and how we should go about attaining it. This process may also
promote civic virtue by enlarging or even replacing our vocabulary about what
should or should not be considered in deciding what such a "good" is. But the
double bind must be considered here as well. Persons are not environmentally
rational or virtuous because they engage in civic-minded political discourse.
Rather, persons engage in civic-minded political discourse because they are
rational or virtuous. Having ruled out coercion as a legitimate means of
instilling public values, civic republican theory can only work by presupposing
that the political community already possesses the virtue that its theorists posit
as the end of political discourse.
The second error in the civic republican concept of citizenship is the claim
that the only way in which individuals can truly make sense of their lives is
102. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES, supra note 85, at 42.
103. See Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379,389-90 (1981) ("In
the political arena, the philosopher's truths are likely to be turned into one more set of opinions,
tried out, argued about, adopted in part, repudiated in part, or ignored.").
104. Gerald E. Frug, Why Neutrality?, 92 YALE L.J. 1591, 1601 (1983) (quoting J.G.A.
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 114 (1975)) (brackets by Frug).
105. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES, supra note 85, at 91.
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through political discourse. The critical ambiguity here is the nature of what
civic republican theory treats as the political."°6 Individuals participate in a
web of relationships in and among institutions and communities." 7 To the
extent that these webs of relationships are regarded as "political," they are
mostly of a decidedly local character. These relationships generate vocabulary
and meaning not only about the content of particular social goods but also
about the extent and scope of authority that each overlapping institution and
community may appropriately seek to exert upon the others.0 '
106. Professors Michelman and Sunstein both recognize this critical ambiguity, but tend to
resolve it by fiat. I agree with Professor Michelman's claim that "much of the country's
normatively consequential dialogue occurs outside the major, formal channels of electoral and
legislative politics, and that in modern society those formal channels cannot possibly provide for
most citizens much direct experience of self-revisionary, dialogic engagement." Michelman, supra
note 89, at 1531. This leads him to endorse the "non-state centered notion of republican
citizenship." Id. Remarkably, however, the guardian of this conception of citizenship is the
Supreme Court--perhaps the most particularist, insular, and non-participatory institution in our
formal structure of "state-centered" institutions! He concludes that
Itihe Court helps protect the republican state-that is, the politically engaged
citizens-from lapsing into a politics of denial. It challenges 'the people's' self-enclosing
tendency to assume their own moral completion as they are now and thus to deny to
themselves the plurality on which their capacity for transformative self-renewal depends.
Id. at 1532. For a different view, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982
Term-Foreword Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983), discussed infra notes
112-117 and accompanying text.
Professor Sunstein also concludes that "[c]itizenship, understood in republican fashion, does
not occur solely through official organs." Sunstein, supra note 89, at 1573. He recognizes that
"[many organizations-including labor unions, religious associations, women's groups of various
sorts, civil rights organizations, volunteer and charitable groups, and others, sometimes marking
themselves outside of and in opposition to conventional society-serve as outlets for some of the
principal functions of republican systems." Id. He then goes on to describe the interests of these
organizations as "prepolitical," claiming that pluralists commit the same sort of misstep
attributable to those who rely on "possessive individualism:"
In both approaches, interests are seen as largely exogenous and prepolitical; in both
politics in governmental processes is a matter of self-interests, and largely of deals; in
both, politics it is normal and legitimate for political actors to seek goods or opportuni-
ties solely on the ground that it is in their interest to do so; in both, there is reason for
considerable suspicion about the state, and in particular about measures that purport to
reflect a unitary public good; in both, spheres of individual and group autonomy are
highly valued; in both, the notion of mediation among conflicting conceptions of the
good seems fanciful.
Id. Thus, it is clear that Sunstein's republicanism is formal and statist; common understandings
and purposes worked out among individuals and groups outside the formal institutions of the
State are "prepolitical," and thus not entitled to any presumptive legitimacy.
107. See generally Katheen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714
(1988).
108. See generally Walzer, supra note 9, at 319.
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Indeed, pluralism might be thought to exist primarily because we have
come to appreciate the idea that the formal political community has no claim
to exclusivity as a forum for social deliberation. Such a claim need not collapse
into Hobbesian atomism, as some civic republican theorists tend to suggest. 9
The distinction between a pluralist view of community and a civic republican
view of citizenship might therefore depend on what we regard as the arena of
politics. If citizenship is meant by civic republicanism to relate mostly to formal
political activity, it differs from pluralism on "the distinction between respecting
and fostering the particular and diverse values of different individual communities
(whatever those values happen to be) on the one hand, and fostering the
(single) value of substantive [i.e., political] community, on the other."'". It is
well to remember, in this respect, that "[wjithout many different and autono-
mous forms of expression, association, and action, oppression is virtually
guaranteed and opportunities for creativity, openness, and reconstruction are
closed off."'.
A justification for pluralism of just this sort is implicit in the work of
Robert Cover. He argued that a normative world of meaning-a nomos-for
the individual is generated by the narratives of local communal involvement.
While "the formal institutions of the law and the conventions of a social order
are, indeed, important to that world; they are, however, but a small part of the
normative universe that ought to claim our attention. '' l The greater part of
our normative universe is created through associational ties, and practices
embedded in more local institutions and communities that stand between the
individual and the formal institutions of the law.
The striking feature of Cover's work is the persuasive manner in which he
describes the possible "jurispathic" consequences of "the formal institutions of
law." His basic point in this respect has been well summarized by Martha
Minow: "For Robert Cover, the state's norms are not necessarily superior.
Certainly, they are not superior simply because they are the state's. The
backing of force and the power to suppress simply mean that the government's
norms are capable of killing off the norms of other communities."".3 This
conception of state law does not always mean such bleakness: "Law is a force,
like gravity, through which our worlds exercise an influence upon one another,
a force that affects the courses of these worlds through normative space.""' 4
That force can sometimes be an "enrichment of social life, a potential restraint
109. See supra notes 106-107 (discussing the problematic notion of the "political").
110. Gardbaum, supra note 82, at 699 (emphasis added).
111. Philip Selznick, Dworkin's Unfinished Task, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 505, 511 (1989).
112. Cover, supra note 106.
113. Martha Minow, Introduction: Robert Cover and Law, Judging, and Violence, in
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 1, 9 (Martha Minow
et al. eds., 1992).
114. Cover, supra note 106, at 9-10.
1994]
30 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [4:1
on arbitrary power and violence.. 1 5 But, as Cover reminds us, the agency of
state law is predicated on acts of coercion and is called into service when
communities (or individuals within them) collide." 6 It is sometimes ruthlessly
violent: "By exercising its superior brute force,.. . the agency of state law shuts
down the creative hermeneutic of principle that is spread throughout our
communities.11 7
What is true of "the agency of state law" in the sometimes violent legal
world of Robert Cover seems likely to be true with respect to the "agency of
political community" in the otherwise romantic world of civic republican-
ism.118 The more we emphasize statist conceptions of community and a
universal conception of the good environmental policy, the more we may need
to rely on the formal institutions of law to make such visions work. Some of
the effects of relying heavily on the force of centralized law are now becoming
more apparent in matters of the environment, as the choices and options of
state and local communities about suitable levels of environmental quality are
becoming more tightly constricted as a matter of constitutional principle." 9
The kind of violence expressed in Cover's work is also at play in the work
of John Rawls, who has for similar reasons attempted to free his political theory
of justice from metaphysical presuppositions. 2 ' That is, we don't need to link
our talk of justice and legitimacy to some sort of "philosophical founda-
tions. ;"' Civic republican theory refuses to break the connection. Moreover,
it falls to articulate in sufficiently tangible terms just what citizenship and a
commitment to "dialogic self-modulation" might entail in our pluralistic society.
As Michael Walzer has argued, "Any historical community whose members
shape their own institutions and laws will necessarily produce a particular and
115. Id. at 68.
116. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1628 (1986) ("So let us be
explicit. If it seems a nasty thought that death and pain are at the center of legal interpretation,
so be it."); Id at 1629 ("Between the idea and the reality of common meaning falls the shadow
of the violence of law, itself.").
117. Cover, supra note 106, at 44.
118. See generally Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 801, 858-79 (1993).
119. These restrictions have taken a variety of forms, from "dormant" commerce clause
limitations, to limitations on the police power enforced through the "takings" clause. See Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (takings clause); Chemical Waste
Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (dormant commerce clause); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992) (dormant commerce
clause).
The "federalization" of environmental law is a much debated topic. See, e.g., Stewart,
Regulation in a Liberal State, supra note 1, at 1546 (arguing that "[i]nterstate mobility of products,
capital, and pollution undermine local or state environmental initiatives, and invite nationwide
solutions."); Frug, supra note 104, at 1600 (arguing that "local communities must be empowered
to make environmental decisions").
120. Rawls, supra note 84, at 4.
121. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 57 (1989).
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not a universal way of life."' If within our polity there are many such
"particular" ways of life or "historical communities," the particularity that each
displays "can be overcome only from the outside and only by repressing
internal political processes."''  Given the fact of pluralism, the better
argument may be that we should strive to maintain a discourse that views the
maintenance of a private sphere as an object of political conversation.'24 As
Richard Rorty notes:
We can urge the construction of a world order whose model is a bazaar
surrounded by lots and lots of exclusive private clubs.... Such a bazaar is,
obviously, not a community, in the strong approbative sense of "community"
used by critics of liberalism like Alasdair McIntyre and Robert Bellah. You
cannot have an old-timey Gemeinschaft unless everybody pretty much agrees
on who counts as a decent human being and who does not. But you can have
a civil society of the bourgeois democratic sort."z
Moreover, that might not be so bad. A "civil society of the bourgeois
democratic sort" rests on an "unjustifiable hope, and an ungrounded but vital
sense of human solidarity."'26 This sense involves a profound rejection of the
"inferential connection between the disappearance of the transcendental
subject-of 'man' as something having a nature which society can repress or
understand-and the disappearance of human solidarity."2 7
III. UN-FREEZING THE DIALECTIC: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UNCHAINED
FROM THE CONSTRAINTS OF LEGITIMACY
To this point I have argued that two very different conceptions of the
democratic process do not, and cannot, satisfy their own criterion for legitimacy
in the context of environmental policy-making. How, in such a telos-less
political community, should we determine what to do as we confront ever more
serious forms of environmental degradation? To resolve this question, I want
to sketch some reasons for believing that we should quickly abandon any notion
that our choices should be tightly constrained within a particular conception of
democratic legitimacy. The major task in this essay is to dispel one notion that
122. Walzer, supra note 103, at 395. For a similar view, see CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL
414-16 (1975).
123. Walzer, supra note 103, at 395.
124. For an argument along these lines, see Raws, supra note 84, at 1-8. This is not to imply
a radical distinction between the public and private-or perhaps "personal"-spheres of social
and political life. Any attempt to draw such lines is inevitably a political matter. See Frank I.
Michelman, Private Personal But Not Split: Radin Versus Rorty, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1783, 1794
(1990) (concluding that "what ought to be secured" as "personal" "is the most deeply and
constantly political of questions").
125. Richard Rorty, On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz, 25 MICH. L. REv. 525,
533 (1986) (emphasis in the original).
126. RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 208 (1982).
127. Id.
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is common, implicitly or explicitly, both to civic republican and liberal economic
theory. That notion is that there is some privileged form of political discourse,
the criteria of which can rightfully claim democratic legitimacy. The idea at
work in these theories is that there is some discrete stopping point in our
experiment in democracy-a moment that freezes a truth or a way of talking
about it-that we are all prepared or can rightfully be forced to accept as such.
These theories' conceptions of truth, their principles, are purely procedural.
They do not describe in any meaningful way what our environmental policy
would achieve should their approaches be fully implemented, nor do they
describe how different communities or social relations might be affected by a
rigid adherence to their respective legitimating criteria. One can well imagine
circumstances in which the property rights approach advocated by liberal
economic theory might yield pockets of environmental degradation so severe
as to disrupt or destroy the entire fabric of a community. Similarly, it takes no
great insight to understand that civic republican theory's requirement of
universalism might translate into a lowest common denominator strategy that
yields intolerably large amounts of environmental degradation.'28
The frozen truth offered by these legitimating theories will thaw in context
as we continue our experiment in democratic governance. When faced with
choices, we fall back on the available heuristics, with all their ungrounded
presuppositions and biases, in an effort to make sense of a new social situation,
and then we act in a way that conforms to that sense of context. But in this
operationalizing process of discourse and action, new, sometimes competing,
truths are created, and conflicting interpretations eventually may (or may not)
generate radically different ideas about the legitimate scope and method of
governmental regulation. This constant working out of meaning in which we
are all engaged may deprive us of legitimating comfort, but it need not bury us
in desperation either. Breaking the chains of closure-or theories that promise
it-liberates us from the mistakes of history and enables us to remove the link
of necessity to existing social practices that are plainly undesirable.
In contrast, there is the formal institution of law to consider. We do count
on it to resolve competing claims, to fix entitlements and assign responsibilities
in the face of conflict. Law must surely rely on some criterion for decision,
some privileged form of discourse. But that "necessity" is simply the
recognition that "some particular social practice [must] block the road of
inquiry, halt the regress of interpretations, in order to get something done."1 29
The criteria of environmental law that apply to environmental decision making
are in a constant state of flux, defying facile descriptions. When we seek
something less plastic, more grounded, we must necessarily refuse to make the
128. Cf. Peter H. Sands, International Cooperation: The Environmental Experience, in
PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 236, 240 (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991) (describing
how international conventions, which rely on universality or unanimity, "tend to reflect the lowest
common denominator").
129. Rorty, supra note 126, at xli.
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pragmatic judgments needed to "halt the regress of interpretations." Indeed,
there are signs that we are becoming less willing to make such pragmatic
judgments. There is a drive toward comprehensiveness, a demand to take into
account "all the relevant factors," that is pushing environmental law more and
more in the direction of the legitimating criteria of liberal economic theory. It
was not so long ago that Judge McGowan could proclaim a "new approach
reflect[ing] developing views on practicality and rights:' 130
ITihe new approach implemented changing views as to the relative rights of the
public and of industrial polluters.... Henceforth, the right of the public to a
clean environment would be pre-eminent, unless pollution treatment was
impractical or unachievable.... This new view of relative rights was based in
part on the hard-nosed assessment of our scientific ignorance .... the widely
shared conviction that the nation's quality of life depended on its natural
bounty, and that it was worth incurring heavy cost to preserve that bounty for
future generations.3
Similarly, Judge Skelly Wright concluded that when "evidence [is] difficult to
come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge... we will not [as courts] demand rigorous step-by-step proof' to
support environmentally protective policies.'32 Implicit in these approaches
is the recognition that there is simply no "fact of the matter" to be discovered,
and we will have to create these facts by relying on our considered contextual
judgments about the appropriateness of particular regulatory decisions. Now,
however, courts are increasingly demanding that those unknowable facts be
discovered and detailed in a "rigorous step-by-step" manner to support
regulatory decisions. Consider in this respect, the D.C. Circuit's embrace of
cost-benefit analysis under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 33 as a
"systematic weighing of pros and cons.', 134 Or consider also the Fifth Circuit's
refusal to allow EPA to justify its asbestos ban on the basis of "unquantified
130. Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
131. Id at 1043.
132. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1988).
134. International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1991). As part of
this "systematic" inquiry, Judge Williams suggested that a defensible cost-benefit analysis would
require the agency to consider the adverse effect on workers' health of the proposed safety
regulation itself. Id. at 1326 (Williams, J., concurring). The logic of this conclusion goes like this:
"More regulation means some combination of reduced value of firms, higher product prices, fewer
jobs in the regulated industry, and lower cash wages. All the latter three stretch workers' budgets
tighter .... And larger incomes enable people to lead safer lives." Id. This logic was warmly
received by the Office of Management and Budget, which insisted that OSHA consider these
effects in a rulemaking. See Frank Swoboda, OMB's Logic: Less Protection Saves Lives, WASH.
PoST, Mar. 17, 1992, at A15. The Seventh Circuit recently refused to require OSHA to
undertake such an inquiry. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993). For a detailed account of this attempt to achieve greater
comprehensiveness, see PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 50, at 153-55 (Supp. 1993).
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benefits," because it could easily "make[] a mockery of the requirement[ ]...
that EPA weigh the costs of its action before it chooses the least burdensome
alternative." '35
Perhaps this push for a comprehensive accounting of the costs and benefits
of proposed regulatory measures will ultimately make for better regulation. If
that is the result, however, it will not be because the agency got the facts
associated with its cost-benefit analysis absolutely right. Following John Dewey,
I "would reply that the whole notion of an 'absolute' fact is nonsensical."'36
Rather, it will be because the public, our democratic community, either has
come to view environmental quality as a commodity whose value can be
assessed through the reductionist logic of liberal economic theory, or it has
simply lost the will to undertake the effort needed to communicate its values
to those entrusted with decision making. If the former occurs, we might
simultaneously have satisfied the universalist legitimating criteria of civic
republican theory, though I doubt seriously anyone would consider cost-benefit
analysis the kind of dialogic engagement needed to test and justify pre-existing
preferences. I suspect, however, that the latter is what is driving the push
toward comprehensiveness, and its implications for our experiment in
democracy are demoralizing. Should that day come, in my view, the question
would "remain[] open whether in the case of the agent who claims to be
applying the science of human behavior we are genuinely observing the
application of a real technology or rather instead the deceptive and self-
deceptive histrionic mimicry of such a technology."'3 Justice Marshall made
a similar point, dissenting from the plurality's decision in Industrial Union
Department3 ' to require a quantified showing of "significant risk" before
allowing OSHA to regulate workplace toxins. In his view, "[t]o require a
quantitative showing of a 'significant risk' . . . would either paralyze [OSHA]
into inaction or force [it] to deceive the public by acting on the basis of
assumptions that must be considered too speculative to support any realistic
assessment of the relevant risk."'39
The point of this discussion for environmental policy is simple but also
quite abstract and general. It is implausible to suggest that environmental
policy can be framed consistently through political judgments that meet the
135. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1219 (5th Cir. 1991). While in both the
cases discussed in the text, the judges were obviously well-intentioned, there is another, less
charitable interpretation. The move toward comprehensiveness, with its attendant high decision
costs and procedural complexities reminds one of Calabresi's and Bobbitt's observation that one
way to limit the extent of our commitment to particular values is to "[ilmpos[e] a complicated
procedure [which] functions as a system for allocation." GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBITr,
TRAGIC CHOICES 96 (1978).
136. Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW &
SOCIETY 217, 227 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
137. MacIntyre, supra note 82, at 85.
138. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
139. Id. at 716 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
DEMOCRA TIC LEGITIMACY
criteria of liberal economic theory or civic republican theory when we have no
uncontroversial method for implementing either or, more fundamentally,
choosing one approach over the other. The contingencies of circumstance and
time and the environment itself create a means-ends dialectic that make both
interpretation and judgment necessary and inevitable. There may be discrete
periods of what Kuhn describes as "normal science," 4 ° or what Rorty calls
"normal discourse"'' in our practices, when existing descriptions of a good
environmental policy can be reflexively and routinely applied as law in a
manner that does not seem at all controversial. Ultimately, the legitimacy of
democracy does not depend at all on its ability to lead us into this kind of
discourse of uncontroversial truth claims. "Our democracy is an emblem of
what could be. What could be is a society that develops the capacities of all its
men and women to think for themselves, to participate in the design and testing
of social policies, and to judge the results.""14
IV. CONCLUSION: "MUDDLING THROUGH"
If we are unsure whether it makes sense, or is possible, to speak of some
non-arbitrary common good, or to demand a governmental structure that meets
some criteria of legitimacy, what can we demand of politics in general or
environmental law in particular? Some time ago, Charles Lindblom wrote:
The value problem is... always a problem of adjustments at a margin. But
there is no practicable way to state marginal objectives or values except in
terms of particular policies. That one value is preferred to another in one
decision situation does not mean that it will be preferred in another decision
situation in which it can be had only at great sacrifice of another value.
Attempts to rank or order values in general and abstract terms so that they do
not shift from decision to decision end up ignoring the relevant marginal
preferences. The significance of this ... point.., goes very far. Even if [we]
had at hand an agreed set of values, objectives, and constraints, and an agreed
ranking of these values, objectives, and constraints, their marginal values in
actual choice situations would be impossible to formulate." 3
Lindblom offers a useful way of thinking about democratic politics and law
in the service of environmental quality. Consider four important points in
Lindblom's notion of value "adjustments at the margins." First, Lindblom's
model recognizes that the tension between and among many competing values
makes any rank ordering of public values highly contingent on the circumstan-
ces in which a decision must be rendered. Second, it makes clear that any
attempt to treat ends as distinct from means is a barren, meaningless enterprise,
ultimately begging the question of: "Which policy should we choose?" Third,
140. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970).
141. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 320 (1982).
142. PrrNAM, supra note 136, at 217, 239-40.
143. Charles Lindblom, supra note 18, at 82.
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it refuses to accept as a test of "goodness" the extent to which a given policy
decision achieves pre-determined public values. Once we rid ourselves of the
idea that to be good a policy must exhibit some holistic, "comprehensive
rationality," we will rather insist that "[tlo show that a policy is mistaken ...
one must ... argue that another policy is more to be preferred."' 44 Finally,
Lindblom offers a powerful argument in favor of respecting the limits of
appeals to rationality. Instead of seeking "agreement on what elements in the
decision constitute objectives and on which of these objectives [agreement]
should be sought," the pragmatic approach described by Lindblom "falls back
on agreement wherever it can be found."'45
There are several standing objections to this pragmatic process of "mud-
dling through" as a normative model of environmental decision making.'46
The most important, in my view, is the charge that pragmatism simply takes an
existing social situation as given, making small corrections at the edges but
never examining the core. 47 The idea here is that pragmatism implicitly
legitimates the status quo; "it leaves the world as it is."'48 This pragmatic
focus, it is argued, channels environmental discourse into an existing rhetorical
structure, precluding serious examination of or critical inquiry into its
assumptions, and thus, affirming its privileged status. We are forced into
"normal discourse:" a conversation conducted within a "set of conventions
about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as answering a
question, [and] what counts as having a good argument."' 49  "Abnormal
discourse"--"what happens when someone joins in the discourse who is
ignorant of these conventions or who sets them aside"151--is powerfully
suppressed as irrational or irrelevant.
This claim appeals to the discomfort some experience with the notion that
as a political community we might never be able either to question or legitimate
our core values, or substitute justice and certainty for extant injustice and
confusion. In short, the fear is that we cannot, as a society, ever claim that
some things are simply right and others are clearly wrong.
The short response to these standing objections is that we can make such
judgments in the muddling, pragmatic way Lindblom suggests. A partial answer
lies in the following points. First, this criticism of pragmatism suggests that it
is a method that is freely chosen, that it is replaceable by some other method.
It is questionable whether pragmatism, at least in its more current forms,
144. Id. at 83.
145. Id. at 84.
146. For a general discussion of the perceived weakness of "incrementalism," see Colin Diver,
Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 399 (1981).
147. Id. at 400.
148. Jurgen Habermas, Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter, in AFTER PHILOSOPHY 296,
306 (Kenneth Baynes et al. eds., 1987).
149. Rorty, supra note 141, at 320.
150. Id.
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endorses the idea that there is a unitary method to be used or that it could
make any sense to choose one. Indeed, one of pragmatism's aims is to ask us
to imagine what a world without meta-theories might look and feel like, to free
ourselves from "theory-guilt." Democracy, in its Deweyan moments, is the
political expression of that freedom. Pragmatism invites us to live with "the
sense that there is nothing deep down inside us except what we have put there
ourselves, no criterion that we have not created in the course of creating a
practice, no standard of rationality that is not an appeal to such a criterion, no
rigorous argumentation that is not obedient to our own conventions.""' In
short, with a Deweyan idea, we might "insist that we neither have nor require
a 'theory of everything,' and stress that what we need instead is insight into
how human beings resolve problematical situations."' 52
Second, pragmatic legal responses to the fact of pluralism need not be
inherently conservative. They might instead affirm that "abnormal discourse"
is a continuing fact of political and social life, a source of new and possibly
better vocabularies. In this respect, we should take some stock of the character
of much of our political discourse to discern the manner in which environmental
concerns have penetrated into areas that twenty years ago would hardly have
been imaginable. The recent debate about whether and how to integrate
environmental considerations into the North American Free Trade Agreement
is a prominent example.'53 Those who criticize pragmatism suggest that the
ongoing conflict of values, the fact of pluralism, accepted (and celebrated) by
pragmatism, can be resolved, clearing the way for a kind of "supra-normal"
discourse, freed from the hegemonic chains of interest and ideology, and based
on some ultimate, privileged, and correct vocabulary that truly mirrors the
essence of politics in human society.
In my view, this attack ironically folds into itself. Those who view pragma-
tism as intolerant or oppressive may be the largest enemies of abnormal
discourse. By assuming that there is, or can be, a form of environmental
discourse against which we can assess the legitimacy of varying claims to legal
entitlements, they must additionally contend that arguments that are not cast
in the privileged form should summarily be dismissed as "wrong." Pragmatism,
by contrast, simply acknowledges that such criteria are presently unavailable,
and that the form and meaning of environmental discourse are historically
contingent. "The terms used by the founders of a new form of cultural life will
consist largely in borrowings from the vocabulary of the culture they are hoping
to replace."' 54
151. Rorty, supra note 126, at xlii.
152. Putnam, supra note 136, at 228.
153. See Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration and the Environment: The Evolution of
Legal Regimes, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 173, 192-200 (1992). For a general discussion of how
environmental issues have penetrated trade issues, see generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES (1992).
154. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 56 (1989).
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Indeed, where else would they come from? We create new meanings only
by showing how old meanings fail to perform the work for which they were
adopted. A new paradigm, a redescription, can work only if it resonates deeply
within the community in which it is proposed. It must be situated historically
and must explain the deficiencies of history in practical terms. John Dewey
provides assistance in understanding the formative and transformative nature
of our experiment in democracy:
The old and the new have forever to be integrated with each other, so that the
values of old experience may become the servants and instruments of new
desires and aims.... Human life gets set in patterns, institutional and moral.
But change is also with us and demands the constant remaking of old habits
and old ways of thinking, desiring and acting .... In its large sense, this
remaking of the old through union with the new is precisely what intelligence
is.' 55
Another related critique of pragmatism might seem particularly apt to
environmental policy. "The case for comprehensive rationality seems especially
compelling with regard to environmental policy because the synoptic approach
is so confluent with the holistic ecological principles that serve as articles of
faith among committed environmentalists." '56 Muddling through, under this
view, is simply too risky because failure can wreak tragic environmental
consequences, perhaps on a global scale. Indeed, William Ophuls has argued
that one of the chief vices of muddling through is its "remedial orientation in
which policies are designed to cure obvious immediate ills rather than to bring
about some desired future state."'57 For Ophuls, the failure of American
society to pursue a more "synoptic" or "public interest" form of political
discourse has inevitable environmental consequences: government becomes "an
"adhocracy' virtually oblivious to the implications of [its] acts and politically
adrift in the dangerous waters of ecological scarcity."' 8 In short, the impend-
ing ecological crisis-vividly described by Ophuls-leaves us with "no choice
but to search for some ultimate values by which to construct a post-modern
civilization."'' 59
In response to this claim, Lindblom's description of how synoptic policy-
making "breaks down in its handling of values or objectives" seems to me a
complete answer:
The idea that values should be clarified, and in advance of the examination of
alternative policies, is appealing. But what happens when we attempt it for
complex social problems? The first difficulty is that on many critical values or
155. DEWEY, supra note 19, at 49-50.
156. Krier & Brownstein, supra note 15, at 123-24.
157. WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY: PROLOGUE TO A
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE STEADY STATE 191 (1977).
158. Id. at 193.
159. Id. at 237.
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objectives, citizens disagree, congressmen disagree, and public administrators
disagree.16°
Consider also the demands that discussions of "ultimate values" place on
citizens, representatives and other decision makers:
Although the [synoptic] approach can be described, it cannot be practiced
except for relatively simple problems and even then only in a somewhat
modified form. It assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information
that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to
policy when the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is
limited, as is always the case.161
The loss of the legitimating comfort associated with the critique of the
liberal economic and civic republican models does not mean that we should
resign ourselves to the contingency of history by employing a strategy of
retreat. It only means that we should "forswear the search for knockdown
arguments that will convince absolutely everyone that [particular] values are
important" to an effective environmental policy. 62 We should recognize that
political action, necessitated by conflict over ways of living, means that you
cannot always get what you want. To deny that the quest for certainty, for
"legitimacy," is a meaningful project is nothing more or less than a frank
acknowledgement of "the fact that many of our contemporaries, even our most
thoughtful contemporaries, hold deeply different, probably irreconcilable,
visions of the ideal world." More importantly, the loss of legitimating criteria
invites us to accept a potentially much greater gain; to "celebrate a wide-open
and diverse culture"--"the prerequisite to all the central Deweyan virtues:
intelligence, freedom, autonomy, [and] growth."'63 If we can accept this gain,
with all "its inconclusiveness and open-endedness, its demand that we struggle
160. Lindblom, supra note 18, at 81.
161. Id. at 80. The same point is made in ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY
125 (1993): "[R]ationality does not require the most extensive sifting of evidence, computational
exertion, and so on. That process itself has its costs, and some (rough) decision would be made
about the amount of time and energy to be put into any particular decision or formation of
belief." Lindblom has made this particular point forcefully with respect to environmental policy:
[Tihe environment is all interconnected. . . . Believing, then, that everything is
interconnected, we fall into the fallacy of believing the only way to improve those
interconnections is to deal with them all at once .... But because everything is
connected, it is beyond our capacity to manipulate variables comprehensively. Because
everything is interconnected, the whole of the environmental problem is beyond our
capacity to control in one unified policy.
Lindblom, supra note 15, at 84 (emphasis in original).
162. Anthony Weston, Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics, 7 ENVTL.
ETHICS 321, 338 (1985).
163. Id. at 339.
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for own values without being closed to the values and hopes of others,' ' we
may begin to ask the right question: "What alternative policies will better
accomplish the plurality of purpose in our environmental practices?"
164. Id.
